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RECENT DECISIONS
ALIENS-AN

IMMIGRATION

REGULATION THAT

DISTINGUISHES

AMONG ALIENS BY NATIONAL ORIGIN MUST HAVE A RATIONAL BASIS
TO SATISFY THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs,1 citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, brought suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
asking for declaratory and injunctive relief against a regulation 2

promulgated by the defendants s at the direction of the President

1. Plaintiffs included Gholamreza Narenji, Behzad Vahedi, Cyrus Vahidnia,
and the Confederation of Iranian Students. The cases of Narenji v. Civiletti, No.
79-3189 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1979) and Confederation of Iranian Students v. Civiletti, No. 79-3210 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1979), were consolidated on November 27,
1979, pursuant to FFD. R. Civ. P. 42 (a), with a full hearing on the merits held
December 4, 1979. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (1979). Narenji,
Vahedi, and Vahidnia are nonimmigrant alien post-secondary students who have
been admitted to the United States pursuant to an F-1 or J-1 visa. They filed a
class action suit on behalf of all Iranians admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant students and affected by the questioned regulation. Plaintiff Confederation of Iranian Students, with approximately 1500 members, also sought a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendant Attorney General
Benjamin R. Civiletti in regard to the same regulation.
2. Plaintiffs sought both a declaration that 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979) was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. Section 214.5 is an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulation that requires all nonimmigrant alien post-secondary school students who are natives or citizens of Iran
to report to a local INS office or campus representative by December 14, 1979,
with evidence of their current nonimmigrant status. At the time of reporting
each student must present his passport and evidence of the following: (1) his
school enrollment, (2) his payment of fees, (3) the number of course hours in
which he is enrolled, (4) his good standing, and (5) his current address in the
United States. The regulation further provides that failure to comply with the
reporting requirement will be considered a violation of the conditions of the
nonimmigrants' stay in the United States and will subject him to deportation
proceedings under § 1241(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(Act). 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979).
3. Attorney General Civiletti and David Crosland, Acting Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization.
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of the United States.4 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulation required that all Iranian nonimmigrant
alien post-secondary students report to a local INS office by December 14, 1979, with evidence of their current nonimmigrant
status.2 The Government issued the regulation in response to the
international crisis precipitated by the "student" invasion and occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, which
resulted in the detention of United States hostages.' Plaintiffs argued that the challenged regulation violated the equal protection
guarantee of the fifth amendment's due process clause because
defendants singled out only Iranian students.7 Defendants re4. On November 10, 1979, President Carter directed Attorney General Civiletti to "identify any Iranian students in the United States who are not in compliance with the terms of their entry visas, and to take the necessary steps to
commence deportation proceedings against those who have violated applicable
immigration laws and regulations." Announcement on Actions to be Taken by
the Department of Justice, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2107, 2107 (Nov. 10,
1979).
5. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979), See note 2 supra.
6. On November 4, 1979, approximately 2500 Iranian demonstrators, described as "students," invaded and occupied the United States Embassy in Tehran. The demonstrators took as hostages approximately sixty-five United
States citizens working in the Embassy compound in an attempt to force the
United States to agree to specific demands. Although the "students" released
some of the hostages later in November, fifty remained captive. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. at 1134 citing Declaration of Warren Christopher 11, Exhibit
7 to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Injunctive Relief [hereinafter cited as Christopher Declaration]. The
government of Iran failed to take action to protect the Embassy or its personnel,
despite its commitment to do so under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States of America and Iran, 284
U.N.T.S. 93. Following the Embassy takeover, the Prime Minister and a large
number of cabinet officers resigned. A new Cabinet was named, but the successor government maintained an unwillingness to secure the safe release of all hostages or to meet with United States emissaries dispatched to secure release of
the hostages. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. at 1135 citing Christopher Declaration 3. Recognizing the growing anger and concern among United States citizens at the escalation of the situation resulting from continued threats by the
Iranian captors, President Carter directed that several measures, including the
promulgation of the instant regulation, be taken in response to the international
crisis.
These measures included Presidential orders that oil produced in Iran not
enter the United States, Pres. Proc. No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,581 (1979), and
that the assets of Iran located in this country be frozen, Exec. Order No. 12,170,
44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979). Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. at 1135.
7. Narenji, Vahedi, and Vahidnia also maintained that the regulation vio-
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sponded that the regulation did not violate the fifth amendment
because foreign policy determinations of the President and the
Attorney General are not subject to judicial review and compelling governmental objectives justified any discrimination.8 The
district court adopted plaintiffs' argument and declared the regulation unconstitutional.9 On appeal to the United States Court of
lated the fourth amendment because the "compelled interrogation" by INS officials constituted an illegal seizure since the INS had no reasonable grounds to
suspect that a particular Iranian student may have violated the conditions of his
or her nonimmigrant status. Further, Narenji, Vahedi, and Vahidnia claimed
that section 214.5 violated the first amendment, alleging that the primary purpose of the regulation at issue was both to punish Iranian students in the United
States for past demonstrations and to chill the future exercise of their rights of
speech, association, and assembly. An additional cause of action in their
amended complaint asserted defendants' failure to comply with the notice and
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Action, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1976), and the lack of statutory authority for the regulation. Plaintiff Confederation of Iranian Students similarly challenged the issuance of the regulation as
violative of the Administrative Procedure Act on the grounds that the notice
and comment procedure was improperly waived and the Attorney General exceeded the authority vested in him under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Plaintiff Confederation of Iranian Students also alleged that defendant Civiletti's action violated the first amendment and tenets of internation law. Narenji
v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. at 1136.
8. Id. In response to plaintiffs' other allegations of invalidity, defendants
maintained that the waiver of notice and comment was appropriate, as were the
terms of the regulation itself, which, they say, were proper under the authority
given to the Attorney General pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1184(a) (1976).
Section 1103(a) gives the Attorney General the power to administer and enforce
all laws relating to alien immigration and naturalization. Section 1184(a)
prescribes the power of the Attorney General to issue regulations to govern the
admission of nonimmigrant aliens and to insure the departure of those individuals who violate the terms of their nonimmigrant status. Defendants also asserted
that there had been no fourth amendment violation because no "seizure" of the
students had occurred. Additionally, defendants contended that the failure of
plaintiffs to show any impermissibly selective enforcement of the regulation defeated their claim that the first amendment had been violated. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. at 1136.
9. The district court first examined the nonconstitutional grounds of plaintiffs' allegations. These arguments failing, the court then determined that the
regulation was unconstitutional because it violated the fifth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 1137. A finding that section 214.5
was unconstitutional being otherwise compelled, the court found it unnecessary
to reach the issues of the regulation's validity under the first and fourth amendments and under international law. Id. at 1147.
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Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, reversed.10 Held: An Immigration and Nationality Act regulation that directs, under threat
of deportation, any Iranian nonimmigrant alien post-secondary
student to report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
with passport, evidence of good-standing from school, and current
address does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the
fifth amendment's due process clause because it has a rational basis and implicates foreign policy matters, rendering it largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. Narenji v. Civiletti,
No. 79-2460 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1979).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Both the concept of sovereignty and the United States Constitution11 endow Congress with the power to exclude, admit, or deport aliens. Congress has passed extensive legislation pertaining
to alien affairs and currently regulates the immigration of aliens
to the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (Act).12 The Act defines the term "alien" as "any person
not a citizen or national of the United States."13 A "nonimmigrant alien student" is defined as follows:
[A]n alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no
intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student qualified to
pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the United
States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing such a
course of study at an established institution of learning or other
recognized place of study in the United States, particularly
designed by him and approved by the Attorney General after consultation with the Office of Education of the United States, which
institution or place of study shall have agreed to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each nonimmigrant student, and if any such institution of learning or place of
10. Although the circuit court essentially adopted defendants' position, the
court applied the less stringent rational basis test to the regulation's alleged discriminatory effects. The district court applied a strict judicial scrutiny to the
regulation, which forced defendants to show a compelling governmental interest
in its promulgation and application.
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, section 8, cl. 4 grants to Congress the power "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."
12. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). The Act prescribes specific requirements
for the admission of aliens, §§ 1181-1185, the exclusion and deportation of
aliens, §§ 1221-1260, and the naturalization of aliens, §§ 1401-1459.
13. Id. § 1101(a)(3).
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study fails to make reports promptly the approval shall be withdrawn....14

Thus, a nonimmigrant alien is distinguished from a "resident" or
"immigrant" alien, who is characterized as "a person admitted for
permanent residence [in the United States], entitled to work and
live anywhere in the country and eligible for naturalization after
five years of residence."1 5 A further distinction between immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens arises from the fact that no
amount of residence will make a nonimmigrant alien eligible for
naturalization."" A logical policy preference is evident that places
greater restrictions on nonimmigrant aliens, although they are entitled to such rights as procedural due process. 17 The federal government, through the immigration scheme, "invites" immigrant
aliens to enter the United States as permanent residents essentially free of-restrictions "on an equality of legal privileges with
all citizens." ' Nonimmigrant aliens, on the other hand, enter the
United States with the full realization that a variety of restrictions will be placed upon them by the federal government.1 ' The
Attorney General is the official charged with the administration
and enforcement of the Act and "all other laws relating to the
immigration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as the
Act or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State, the officers of
' 20
the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers.
Additionally, the Attorney General is empowered "to perform
such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority" under the provisions of the Act.21 The Attorney General's

14. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i).
15. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 275, 277 [hereinafter cited as

Rosberg].
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (dictum); Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
18, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
19. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184, 1303 (1976). The Attorney General is specifically
authorized "to prescribe special regulations and forms for the registration and
fingerprinting of... aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence." Id. § 1303(a).
20. Id. § 1103(a).
21. Id. Courts have broadly construed this authority to allow the Attorney
General to draw distinctions among nonimmigrant aliens on the basis of na-
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power includes the authority to order the deportation of any nonimmigrant alien who fails to maintain his nonimmigrant status or

to comply with the conditions of such status.22 Thus, situations
arise in which nonimmigrant aliens, or subclassifications thereof,
are subjected to regulations that appear to discriminate between
one group and another. The judiciary's approach to these confrontations takes a variety of forms depending upon factual circumstances.2 3 The Court has used two interrelated grounds to uphold the validity of such regulations when promulgated at the
federal level: (1) the plenary federal power under the Act and the
Constitution; 24 and (2) the power of the Executive in the field of
foreign affairs. 25 Mathews v. Diaz25 and Fiallo v. Bell2 7 explore
the plenary federal power over the area of immigration and naturalization. Under the federal law contested in Mathews, medical
insurance was available to elderly citizens without restriction, but
to immigrant aliens only if they had resided in the country for
five years.28 Plaintiffs argued that if state limitations on an alien's
right to state welfare or state employment violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, then analogous fed-

tional origin as well as on other classifications. The only restraint on the power
of the Attorney General is that his actions must be rationally or reasonably related to the statute he is administering. See, e.g., Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6, 9
(10th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970); Mak v. INS, 435.F.2d 728, 730 (2d
Cir. 1970).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9).
23. Arguments that are commonly made involve alleged violations of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution.
24. Supra note 11. A review of Supreme Court decisions suggests other possible sources of this congressional power. Numerous opinions evidence the constant presence of the federal power theme in decisions rejecting state attempts
to classify on the basis of alienage and upholding the broad power of the federal
government to make alienage classifications. Miller & Steele, Aliens and the
Federal Government: A Newer Equal Protection, 8 U.C.D. L. Rav. 1, 16-18
(1975),
25. As decisions in immigration matters may implicate foreign relations, and
since a wide variety of classifications must be interpreted in light of changing
political and economic circumstances, such decisions are more appropriately addressed by either the Legislature or the Executive than the Judiciary. Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
26. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).

27. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976).
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eral restrictions violated the fifth amendment.29 Mathews held
that the fifth amendment does not require the federal government to extend all the advantages of citizenship to all aliens.30
Rather, the regulation of aliens is entrusted to the political
branches of the federal government, dictating a "narrow standard
of review." 31 Under this review, the Court concluded that it was
not "wholly irrational" for the government to limit the participation of aliens in federal medical insurance programs.3 2 In reaching
its decision, the Mathews Court relied heavily on the unique nature of federal authority over immigration.3 Although at least
one author has expressed dissatisfaction with the Court's reliance
on the plenary power thesis to explain the use of restrained review in Mathews,34 the Court, in Fiallo v. Bell, reaffirmed its reluctance to scrutinize federal statutes dealing with immigration.
Whereas Mathews dealt with lawfully admitted resident aliens,
Fiallo dealt with the special immigration status granted by the
Act to those Who qualify as "children" or "parents" of United
States citizens or lawful permanent residents.3 5 In determining
whether such a relationship exists, the statute excludes the relationship between an illegitimate child and its natural father, but
not the child's natural mother.3 In upholding the distinctions,
the Court stated that "these are policy questions entrusted exclu29. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court indicated that equal protection analysis was the same under the fifth amendment as
it was under the fourteenth amendment. 424 U.S. at 93. In Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), however, Justice Stevens attempted to qualify
the Court's earlier holding, suggesting that protection under the two amend-.
ments was not "coextensive." He noted that "overriding national interests"

might justify discrimination that clearly would be prohibited at the local level.
426 U.S. at 100.
30. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80.
31. Id. at 81-82.
32. Id. at 83.
33. Id. at 81; accord, Fiallo v. Bell, 420 U.S. at 792.
34. Rosberg, supra note 15 at 317.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) & (b)(2) (1976).
36. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(D); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 788-90. The statute in effect discriminated against aliens seeking immigration on two bases that would
normally warrant intensified judicial scrutiny if applied to citizens - sex and
illegitimacy. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down sexbased classification); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down
classification based on illegitimacy applying "not toothless" scrutiny). Maltz,

The Burger Court and Alienage Classifications, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 671, 686
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Maltz].
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sively to the political branches of our Government, and we have
no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that
of the Congress." 7 Fiallo underscored the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation by noting that it has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the
admission of aliens]." ' s The Court also construed plenary federal
power over the area of immigration to include the authority of the
President when the factual circumstances surrounding cases implicate the United States relations with foreign powers.3 9 In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy 4 the Court observed that "any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form
of government." 1 Petitioners in Harisiadeswere resident aliens
ordered deported on the ground that they had become members
of the Communist Party after entering the United States.4 2 Although the party terminated at least one petitioner's membership
in 1939, he continued associating with its members. 43 The deportation orders were based on a provision of the Alien Registration
Act of 194044 that required deportation of any alien who, at the

time of entering the United States or "at any time thereafter,"
became a member of an organization advocating the unlawful
overthrow of the government. 45 The Court upheld the provision's
validity on the ground that the policy toward aliens is exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of the federal government,
therefore rendering it largely immune from judicial inquiry or in37. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 798. In addition to Fiallo,other Supreme Court
decisions advocate the proposition that the Congress or the Executive may draw
reasonable distinctions in the immigration field on the basis of nationality as
well as other classifications. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-82; Maltz, supra note 36 at 684-91; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 258 (1972).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 492.
See Rosberg, supra note 15 at 319.
342 U.S. 580 (1952).
Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 582.

44. 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976)). President Roosevelt approved this Act on June 28, 1940, when a world war was
threatening to involve the United States.
45. Id.
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terference.4" The political branches of government have considerable flexibility in responding to changing world conditions, and
judicial review of decisions made by the Congress or the Presi41
dent in the area of immigration and naturalization is narrow.
This is particularly important in the vast external realm of foreign affairs, in which the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the United States.4 8 The Court in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. described the
gravity of the matter as follows:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment... is to be avoided and success for our
aims achieved, congressional legislation... must often accord to
the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved ....
[H]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war.49
The authority of the President as the sole representative of the
federal government in foreign affairs does not spring exclusively
from an exercise of legislative power. It also exists interrelatedly
as a constitutional grant of power which, like all governmental
powers, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.50 Aside from this responsibility to the
Constitution, the single restraint that the Court places on the
power of either the President, the Congress, or the Attorney General5 1 in the field of immigration and naturalization is that actions
taken must not be "wholly irrational" 2 or so "unreasonably exercised" 53 that they warrant judicial interference.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant decision first addressed appellees' challenge that
46. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 588-90; accord, Fiallo v. Bell, 430

U.S. at 798; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-82.
47. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 796; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-82; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 588-89.
48. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
49. Id. at 320.
50. Id. at 319-20.
51. See note 21 supra.

52. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82-83.
53. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 588-90.
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the Attorney General lacked authority to promulgate the regulation. The court noted that the statute charges the Attorney General with the administration and enforcement of the Act and directs him to "establish such regulations . . . and perform such

other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority
under the provisions of [the Act]. 54 The court also noted that the
Attorney General is directed to prescribe by regulation the period
of time for which any nonimmigrant alien is admitted to the
United States and the conditions of such an admission.5 5 Further,
the opinion stated that the Act authorizes the Attorney General
to order the deportation of any nonimmigrant alien who fails to
maintain his nonimmigrant status or to comply with the conditions of such status.5 Therefore, the court concluded that the applicable statutory provisions of the Act plainly encompass authority to promulgate the challenged regulation. 57 The court next
turned to the question of whether the broad scope of authority
conferred upon him by the Act empowered the Attorney General
to draw distinctions among nonimmigrant alien students on the
basis of nationality. Answering in the affirmative, the decision
cited relevant authority supporting the proposition that the Act
need not specifically authorize every action taken by the Attorney
General as long as the action is reasonably related to his duties.58
The court then examined appellees' charge that the regulation violated their right to equal protection of the laws under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The court cited appropriate authority and held that Congress or the President may draw
distinctions on the basis of nationality within the immigration
54. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 1979), slip op. at 1,
citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976). See notes 20-22 & accompanying text supra.
55. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 1, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)

(1976). See note 8 supra.
56. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 1-2, citing 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(9). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
57. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 2.
58. Id. (emphasis added). See note 21 supra. The court reinforced this conclusion by noting that the Act specifically authorizes the Attorney General "to
prescribe special regulationsand forms for the registration and fingerprinting of
... aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence." Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 2, citing 8
U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976) (emphasis added). See note 19 supra. The court saw no
obstacle to concluding that the promulgation of the challenged regulation was
directly and reasonably related to the Attorney General's duties and authority
under the Act. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 2.
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field. Further, the court stated that such distinctions must be sustained if they are not wholly irrational.59 Next, the court examined whether there were circumstances in the instant case that
provided a rational basis for the issuance of the regulation. The
court noted that an affidavit by the Attorney General stated that
the regulation was issued "as an element of the language of diplomacy by which international courtesies are granted or withdrawn
in response to actions taken in foreign countries." 60 Recognizing
that the instant controversy is inextricably tied up in the United
States handling of its foreign affairs, the court cited Mathews v.
Diaz and stated that the promulgation of the regulation implicates matters over which the President has direct constitutional
authority. 1 Thus, the court concluded that the regulation is supported by a rational basis.2 Next, the court examined to what
extent the judiciary can inquire into the propriety of the regulation. The instant opinion noted that the district court "went beyond an acceptable judicial role"6 3 when it undertook to evaluate
the policy reasons behind the regulation. The court further
noted that it is not the business of the judiciary to pass judgment
on the decisions of the President in the field of foreign policy because judges, not being expert in that field, lack the information
necessary for the formation of a knowledgeable opinion. 5 The
court also stated that the probable effect of a statute such as the
challenged regulation is a judgment that must be made by the
President; it is not permissible for the courts to overrule the Executive in the absence of acts that are clearly in excess of his au-

59. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. 3. See text accompanying notes
26-38 supra.
60. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 3. The affidavit further
stated: "the action implemented by these regulations is therefore a fundamental
element of the President's efforts to resolve the Iranian crisis and to maintain
the safety of the American hostages in Tehran." Id.; See note 6 supra.
61. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 3-4. See note 25 supra.
62. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 4, citing Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1970); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). See text accompanying notes 26-53 supra.
63. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 4.
64. Id.
65. Id. In the remainder of the opinion, the court cited United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), and relied heavily on quotations taken from Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-82, and Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). See note 25 & text accompanying notes 30-34
& 39-53 supra.
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thority6 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the regulation must
be sustained.6
In a concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon expressed complete
agreement with the court's decision, but wrote separately to add
three additional points of support for its ruling.6 8 The concurrence first noted that the promulgation of the instant regulation
was not an isolated act of diplomacy in the international crisis,
but stressed that other measures were taken as part of the same
diplomatic effort.69 Second, the concurrence stated that the regulation "seeks 'to identify Iranian students in the United States
who are not maintaining status and to take immediate steps to
commence deportation proceedings against such persons' (44
F.Reg. 65, 727 [1979]) 'in accordance with constitutional due process requirements.' (Defendant's Ex. 3). ''70 In explaining the disparate treatment afforded appellee nonimmigrant alien students
in violation of United States immigration laws, the concurrence
pointed out that the Government of Iran, when it committed a
number of "violent lawless acts" against the United States and its
citizens, placed appellees and other similarly situated students
who owe their allegiance to that country in a different class for
immigration purposes from the nonimmigrants of any other country. 71 Therefore, the concurrence concluded that since the Iranian
government has made appellees part of a distinctly separate class,
the United States, under its Constitution, may treat them differently because of the reasons that separate them from other aliens
in the United States. 2 Third, the concurrence stated that the status of the Iranian students cannot be disassociated from their
connection with their mother country since an alien "leaves out66. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 5-6.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 7 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
69. In addition to the embargo on crude oil produced in Iran and the freeze
of the Iranian government's assets in the United States, discussed at note 6
supra, the concurrence took judicial notice of reports that substantial forces of
the United States Navy were moved to the Indian Ocean and that the President
ordered the Iranian Embassy and consulate in the United States to return approximately eighty-five percent of its diplomatic staff to Iran. Narenji v. Civi-

letti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 7.
70. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 7.

71. Id. at 7-8.
72. Id. at 8. The concurrence further concluded that "[t]he different treat-

ment [the students] may receive under [the] regulation is directly related to the
reasons for their different classifications." Id.
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standing a foreign call on his loyalties which international law not
only permits [the United States Government] to recognize but
commands it to respect."7' 3 The concurrence further noted that
the connection with the home country also means that the power
of the United States Government to terminate an alien's stay is a
necessary corrollary to that observation. 4 Therefore, the concurrence concluded that the actions of the President and the Attorney General "bear a reasonable relation to protection of the legitimate interests of the United States '7'5 and conform to due process
requirements.7
IV.

COMMENT

The instant opinion appears to endow the federal government
with unlimited power to discriminate not only against aliens, but
also among classes of aliens, on the basis of national origin when
the government can demonstrate an involvement with the foreign
relations of the United States. Although the District of Columbia
Circuit reached a sound result in the instant case, its rationale
suffers from a single deficiency. The court failed to address the
limits that should be placed on the government's power to discriminate based upon national origin when there is an involvement with foreign affairs. An analysis of federal and Supreme
Court decisions supports the instant court's narrow standard of
review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the
area of immigration and naturalization. 7 As enunciated by the
Court, the only limitations on the power of the Legislature and
the Executive in this area are: (1) the applicable provisions of the
Constitution and (2) the rule of law that actions taken must not

73. Id., citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 586.
74. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 8. The concurrence then cites
a lengthy quotation from Harisiades that stands for the proposition that because an alien's legal status in the United States is not entirely in parity with
that of a citizen and because his ability to remain is a matter of permission or
tolerance and not of right, the alien remains vulnerable to expulsion, which is a
weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 587-88.
75. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 9, citing Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 584.
76. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 9, citing Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 588-91.
77.

Rosberg, supra note 15 at 316-36.
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Certainly no decision of the Supreme

Court can be cited as directly supporting any further limitations.
From the earliest cases, the judiciary has declared that determinations of Congress and the President in the immigration field
are political in nature and not subject to judicial scrutiny. 9 The
Court maintains, with respect to immigration and naturalization,
that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete." 80 Therefore, in the immigration field, the
Court is reluctant to enforce the constitutional standards that
control the exercise of other Congressional powers. 8 ' The importance of the interests involved has generated persistent efforts to
question the assumption that Congressional pronouncements in
the immigration area are unassailable. Although every attack thus
far has failed, the tenor of recent Supreme Court expressions has
revealed a marked reluctance to endorse a doctrine of limitless
power.8 2 The Court has not implied that the power to regulate
immigration overrides all constitutional limitations. Although
the
Court has repeatedly described the power as plenary, the use of
that term does not in itself suggest that the power is without limits under the Constitution. The Court has described the President's "delicate, plenary and exclusive power

. . .

in the field of

international relations" as a power that "like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 8 s3 As mentioned above, the

78. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
79. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
80. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
81. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); United
States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Hein v. INS, 456 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.
1972). See generally, Hertz, Limits to the NaturalizationPower, 64 GEo. L.J.
1007 (1976); Note, 80 YALE L.J. 769 (1971).
82. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wang, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (decisions of the political branch of the government "dictates a narrow standard of review of decisions
made by Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization"); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (despite "paramount federal power
over immigration and naturalization," broad discrimination justifies "some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation" even though due process applicability is limited); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (while Congress has "exceptionally
broad power" to define classes of admissible aliens, the exercise of such power
may be subject to "limited judicial review" in an extreme case, at the behest of
the appropriate party).
83. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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"narrow standard of review" is currently in vogue, but such a
standard still places nearly limitless power in the hands of the
federal government. Particularly when there is some aspect of foreign affairs involved, the opportunity for abuse of this discretion
is too substantial to remain unchecked. The instant court is correct in its analysis of the law governing the validity of the challenged regulation; and the result it reached is sound, considering
the international crisis that precipitated the controversy. The
weakness of the opinion lies in its apparent endorsement and expansion of the plenary federal power thesis at the expense of individual rights and liberties. Such a weakness portends incrementally increasing encroachments on heretofore constitutionally
protected territory. The Supreme Court erects only artificial obstacles when it asks the government to demonstrate "overriding"
or "legitimate" national interests in order for their actions, under
the language of the instant opinion, to pass constitutional examination. Whatever the Court's intention, its repeated insistence
that Congress has plenary power to regulate the activities of
aliens without adequate limitations must be seen as an invitation
to Congress to act capriciously and without significant concern for
the legitimate interests of aliens. If the judiciary is forbidden to
inquire into the proposed effect of legislation on the rights of
those subject to the legislation,84 it will not be in a position to
determine whether there is truly a legitimate national interest
that would justify the abridgement or restriction of those individual rights. Similarly, if the judiciary is forbidden to inquire into
the policy reasons upon which legislation is based,"5 it will not be
in a position to determine whether such legislation is wholly irrational. Followed to a logical extreme, this implies that the judiciary will be unable to perform its duty of safeguarding the rights
of individuals under the Constitution. The problem with the cur-

84. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460, slip op. at 5-6.
85. Id. at 4. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), the Court
upheld legislation establishing a curfew for persons of Japanese ancestry. Justice
Murphy (concurring) reinforced the hesitancy of the Court to restrict personal
liberties in all but the most extreme circumstances. He stated as follows:
While this Court sits, it has the inescapable duty of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed. That duty exists in time of war as
well as in time of peace, and in its performance, we must not forget that
few indeed have been the invasions upon essential liberties which have not
been accompanied by pleas of urgent necessity advanced in good faith by
responsible men.
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rent narrow standard of review in immigration cases is that virtually any action the government takes could be described as not
"wholly irrational" when there is involvement with the foreign relations of the United States. The nature of foreign affairs dictates
that the President has direct constitutional authority as the sole
representative of the United States in its external relations; 86 and,
with respect to immigration, the decisions of the political
branches are largely immune from judicial control.8 7 With the
merger of these two propositions, the rights of aliens in the
United States become dependent upon the maintenance of peaceful relations between the United States and their home countries.
Consequently, it is not difficult to envision possible circumstances
in which the courts might find that a legislative mandate conflicts
with some safeguard of the Constitution. If the threat of this situation is to be averted, judicial opinions examining the interrelationship between immigration and foreign affairs must attempt to
express flexible limits on the merger of authoritty in such cases.
These limits are essential in order that future courts may simultaneously perceive both the delineation of expansive federal powers
in this area and the enumeration of protected rights of aliens
under the Constitution. Only in this fashion will the rights and
liberties of every individual be preserved.
Scott R. Valby

86.
87.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 792.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT SHOULD NOT BE CURTAILED AT THE PRE-DISCOVERY STAGE
IF SIGNIFICANT UNITED STATES INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED AND
THERE ARE FACTUAL DISPUTES CONCERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF

ANTITRUST-

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE.

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs,' an individual and a number of United States and
Dominican corporations affiliated to establish hotel and condominium accommodations in the La Romana section of the Dominican Republic, alleged they were hindered in their efforts by ille-2
gal acts of the defendant, United States and Dominican concerns
that own and operate existing tourist facilities in La Romana.
Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, for treble damages and injunctive relief.
The complaint alleged slander and unfair competition and asserted causes of action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.3 Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants, through fraud and
1. Dominicus Americana Bohio, a limited partnership, is the principal
plaintiff. Other plaintiffs include one individual, Wayne Fuller, and ten
other United States and Dominican corporations or limited partnerships.
2. A Delaware corporation, Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. (G & W), is
the principal defendant. Other defendants are The Dominican Tourist Information Center, a New York corporation, a number of G & W's subsidiaries, and several undesignated parties.
3. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976) state
that:
§1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprison-
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coercion, improperly influenced the Dominican government to
take anticompetitive actions unfavorable to plaintiffs. According
to plaintiffs, defendants encouraged government officials: 1) to
prevent or inhibit plaintiffs from using La Romana marinas; 2) to
relocate a road that was to serve plaintiffs' facilities; 3) to prohibit charter flights from landing at the La Romana Airport if
they were transporting guests to plaintiffs' complex; 4) to delay
government approval for a number of steps involved in the construction of plaintiffs' facility; and 5) to expropriate plaintiffs'
private land in order to create a national park.4 Plaintiffs further
alleged that defendants: 1) interfered with plaintiffs' construction
scheme by blockading a public road; 2) encouraged local concerns,
including private transportation companies and a tourist information center,5 to impede plaintiffs' progress; and 3) promoted meritless litigation to cloud title to plaintiffs' land. Defendants argued that the act of state doctrine precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction over at least some of these claims, and that several of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.6 Defendants also
contended that plaintiffs' complaint contained a number of fatal
errors,7 and that in the alternative, the court should refuse jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. On defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary
judgment on the applicablity of the act of state doctrine, denied.
ment not exceeding three years or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
4. The Dominican government, however, rescinded its confiscation order
soon after discovering that the land involved was plaintiffs' property. Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 685 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
5. Plaintiffs claimed that the Dominican Tourist Information Center, a nominally neutral organization sanctioned by the Dominican government, discouraged tourists from visiting plaintiffs' resort area and encouraged them to go to
the defendants' complex instead. Id.
6. Defendants argued that many of the plaintiff corporations, such as subcontractors that had arranged to provide goods and services to the facilities
when the construction was completed, were affected only indirectly by defendants' acts and were therefore not within the "target area" of defendants' alleged antitrust violations. Id. at 686.
7. Defendants alleged that the plaintiffs neither averred nor showed that the
acts complained of placed a substantial burden on interstate' commerce sufficient to support jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Defendants also argued
that plaintiffs' definition of the relevant market was too narrow and that the
allegations of fraud, corruption, and conspiracy were not pled with sufficient
specificity. Id. at 686-87.
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Held: In complex antitrust suits involving issues of transnational
legal significance, United States courts should not refuse to accept subject matter jurisidiction at the pre-trial state of litigation
if: (1) many defendants as well as plaintiffs are United States corporations; (2) the anti-competitive conduct is alleged to have occurred in the United States; and (3) there are factual disputes
concerning the applicability of the act of state doctrine.
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In Underhill v. Hernandez,8 the seminal act of state case, the
Supreme Court held that the courts of the United States will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another state,
done within that state's own territory. Twelve years later, in 1909,
the Court decided American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,'
which cast serious doubt on the applicability of United States antitrust laws to actions taken outside the territory of the United
States. Expanding the Underhill philosophy, Justice Holmes'
opinion stated that the characterization of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done. 10 Gradually, the doctrine enunciated in
American Banana eroded;1" it was first expressly distinguished in
United States v. Sisal Sales.12 In Sisal, the complaint alleged
that three United States banks conspired with other United
States nationals and a Mexican corporation to obtain a monopoly
in the trade of sisal,"3 including the export of sisal into the United
States. As part of this conspiracy, the defendants allegedly motivated the Mexican and Yucatan governments to pass discriminatory legislation in favor of a Mexican corporation. The Court distinguished American Banana on the Sherman Act issue,
concluding that the act complained of in American Banana took
place in a foreign country (Costa Rica), while the conspiracy in
Sisal was entered into and made effective by acts committed
within the United States. Sisal evidenced a clear retreat from

8. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
9. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
10. Id. at 356.
11. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
12. 274 U.S. 268, 275 (1927).
13. Sisal is a fiber used to make rope.
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American Banana, indicating that jurisdiction would be found
when there was a trade effect in the United States and some conspiratorial conduct occurred domestically, even though more significant anti-competitive activity took place abroad. The 1945
landmark decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)14 almost completely vitiated the
jurisidictional issue of American Banana. Judge Learned Hand
argued that although Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to
prohibit conduct that has no consequences in the United States,
it did intend to reach conduct outside the United States that has
a sufficient effect on the interstate or foreign commerce of this
country. 15 Alcoa gave birth to the well-known "effects" test,
which has since been augmented by later cases and commentators. Recent cases have interpreted the effects test to mean that
an effect on interstate or foreign commerce in the United States
that is not both insubstantial and indirect (i.e., not de minimus)
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.16 Sometimes juxtaposed on this
framework, however, is a balancing test that perhaps indicates a
resurfacing of the American Banana doctrine. This test argues
that the impact of the foreign conduct on United States commerce must be weighed against the potential international repercussions of asserting jurisdiction. 17 These repercussions may generally be measured by analyzing factors such as the relative
importance of the alleged violation of conduct in the United
States compared to that abroad, the degree of conflict with for8
eign law or policy, and the nationality of the parties involved.

If

14. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
15. Id. at 443-44.
16. See Continental Ore v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 610-11,
613, 615 (9th Cir. 1976); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,
331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
17. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d
Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S. A., 549 F.2d
at 611-12, 614.
18. The Third Circuit has suggested that the following factors should be considered in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared
to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
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a court has applied this balancing test and found that such factors outweigh potential international repercussions, thereby passing the jurisidictional threshold on the issue of extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, the court may still confront a
compelling act of state defense if an act of a foreign sovereign was
involved. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 9
the Supreme Court restated the Underhill doctrine20 as follows:
"The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy
of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of
foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations."2 1 Any lawsuit, therefore, that challenges the validity per se
of an act of a foreign sovereign is non-justiciable in United States

courts. 22 Less clear is the situation in which an antitrust conspira5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; [and]
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (court's footnote
omitted). The Ninth Circuit's approach, which was cited with approval by the
Mannington Mills court, includes the following factors as part of its balancing
test:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there
is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the forseeability
of such effect, and the relative importance of the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, N. T. & S. A., 549 F.2d at 614. The
instant court relied somewhat more heavily on the Mannington Mills court's
analytical framework. 473 F. Supp. at 688.
19. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
20. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
21. 425 U.S. at 697, citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 427-28, 431-33 (1964).
22. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 697;
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tor purposefully involves a foreign government in an anticompetitive scheme in order to obtain the immunity that attaches to an
3 was unwilling to allow
act of state. The Supreme Court in Sisal"
an act of state defense to be based on the mere approval of a
foreign government or on foreign government actions that were
directly induced by the defendant. The Court reaffirmed this postion in Continental Ore v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.2 4 The
Canadian government appointed a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary to one of the defendants as its exclusive wartime agent for
the importation and allocation of ferrovanadium and vanadium
oxide. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had improperly influenced the subsidiary to exclude plaintiff from the Canadian ferrovanadium market, resulting in a violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court found that "(a)s in Sisal, the conspiracy was laid in
the United States, was effectuated both here and abroad, and respondents are not insulated by the fact that their conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign government. 25 A number of commentators, in apparent approval of these Supreme
Court decisions, have argued that private acts aimed at instigating foreign governmental action to restrain trade should not be
immune from judicial scrutiny; to allow such acts immunity
would in effect invite would-be antitrust conspirators to involve
foreign governments in monopolistic schemes. 26 The Second Circuit, however, has not limited the application of the act of state
doctrine to cases challenging the validity of acts of foreign governments. When it is necessary to inquire into the motivation behind an anticompetitive act of a foreign government in order to
determine whether the decision was instigated by a private defendant, the Second Circuit will apply the act of state doctrine.2 7 The court in Hunt stated that "the issue of legality cannot be isolated from the issue of motivation of the foreign sovereign." 28 Perhaps due partly to this broad construction, several

Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 1977).
23. 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
24. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
25. Id. at 706.
26. See Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and InternationalBuying Cooperation,84 YALE L.J. 268, 282-83 (1974); Note, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand
the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLuM. L. REV. 1247, 1260 (1977).
27. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d at 78.
28. Id. See also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.
Supp. at 110-11.
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exceptions to the doctrine are developing. If the government act
in question is of a commercial nature, it may not be immunized as
an act of state.29 Also, the initiation of judicial proceedings in a
foreign country does not constitute an act of state even though
foreign courts determine the ultimate result of the proceedings.30
Another possible exception of the act of state doctrine pertains to
acts of a foreign government procured through fraud, coercion, or
corruption of government officials. Hunt expressly left open the
question whether the act of state doctrine applies if bribery is
alleged;$' moreover, several commentators have stated that it is
inappropriate to allow corporations to invoke the act of state doctrine to protect questionable payments made to foreign government officials.3 2 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 33 which states
that legitimate attempts to petition the United States government cannot be attacked on antitrust grounds, probably does not
preclude application of the Sherman Act to such questionable
payments. At least one case has questioned whether the NoerrPennington rationale has any bearing at all on acts in foreign
countries. 3 ' In any event, the doctrine does not immunize any
government petition that is "[a] sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor."3 5 Thus, there are at least two
major issues that continue to arise in cases attempting to apply
the Sherman Act extraterritorially: 1) whether the act of state
doctrine automatically precludes examination of the motivation
of a foreign government's anticompetitive act in order to establish

29. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 69395; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d at 73.
30. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S. A., 549 F.2d at
608.
31. 550 F.2d at 79.
32. See McManis, Questionable CorporatePayments Abroad: An Antitrust
Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 237 (1976); Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire:
The Noerr-PenningtonDefense, 66 MICH. L. REv. 333, 350-51 (1967); Note,
supra note 26, at 1262.
33. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern
Railroad Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
34. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. at 10708.
35. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 511
(1972), (quoting Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight Inc., 365 U.S. at 144).
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defendant's guilt; and 2) which exceptions to the act of state doctrine United States courts should recognize.
III. THE

INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, the court found that even wholly foreign
conduct may come within the purview of the antitrust laws if it
has a sufficient effect on the interstate or foreign commerce of the

United States.36 The court stated that the effects test alone is inadequate because it fails to consider potential problems of international comity. According to the court, the proper standarnd
also involves balancing the impact of the foreign conduct on
United States commerce against the potential international repercussions of asserting jurisdiction.3 7 In the instant case, the court
found that when the record addressed the key elements of such a
balancing test, it supported jurisdiction; many of the defendants
as well as the plaintiffs were United States corporations, some of
the anticompetitive conduct was alleged to have occurred in the
United States, and United States consumers were "exported" to
take advantage of the services provided in the Dominican Republic.3 8 The instant court indicated that discovery would be necessary to elucidate other factors relevant to the foreign relations issue. 9 With regard to the act of state doctrine, the instant court
held that many of the acts alleged in the complaint fall outside
the doctrine's penumbra, and therefore are justiciable. 40 Among
these alleged acts are defendants' obstruction of a public road in
order to inhibit plaintiffs' construction, and defendants' encouragement of local concerns to impede plaintiffs' progress. 4 ' The instant court also found that the allegation that defendants promoted and financed meritless litigation designed to cloud title to
plaintiffs' property presented a justiciable issue since the initiation of judicial proceedings in a foreign country is not encom36. Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 473 F. Supp. at
687.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 688.
39. The factors the court listed include: "the degree of conflict with foreign
law, the relative importance of the alleged antitrust violations in the Dominican
Republic, the availability of a remedy there, and the existence of any agreement
between the United States and the Dominican Republic regarding antitrust policy." Id. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
40. Id. at 689.
41. Id.
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passed by the act of state doctrine.42 The instant court somewhat
reluctantly applied the Hunt rule that states that the act of state
doctrine precludes an investigation of the motivation of a foreign
government's act. 43 The court found, however, that some of the
Dominican government's acts, such as rerouting a road and
prohibiting plaintiffs from using the La Romana airport, might
44
perhaps come under the Dunhill commercial activity exception.
Furthermore, the court noted that discovery on this matter was
needed before any such determination could be made. 45 The court
also held that the Dominican government's expropriation of
plaintiffs' land in order to create a national park "would appear
to be a quintessential public act," and would therefore seem to be
nonjusticiable under the act of state doctrine. 6 The instant court
suggested, however, that since the Dominican government rescinded its confiscation order when it learned that the land belonged to plaintiffs, the original act (and defendants' alleged complicity therein) might not be subject to act of state immunity.
The court cited Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino47 to sup-

port the proposition that an act that would normally be immune
from judicial inquiry may lose its privileged status if the government subsequently repudiates it. 48 The court in the instant case

then argued that even an unrepudiated act of state may be scrutinized if it resulted from the corruption of government officials;
Hunt 9 and several law review articles" were cited as supporting
this idea.5 1 The instant court then addressed the defendants'
other defenses and found, for the purposes of a summary judgment motion, that the plaintiffs' market definition was sufficient,
that all plaintiffs had standing to sue, and that the plaintiffs'
complaint contained no fatal errors. 52 Finally, the court concluded
that the record before it supported a finding of jurisdiction, and
42. Id., (quoting Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S. A.,

549 F.2d at 608).
43.

473 F. Supp. at 689. See text accompanying note 27 supra.

44. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
45. 473 F. Supp. at 689-90.
46. Id. at 690.
47. 376 U.S. at 432.
48. 473 F. Supp. at 690.
49. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d at 79.
50. McManis, supra note 32, at 236-37; Note, supra note 32, at 1262.
51. 473 F. Supp. at 690.
52. Id. at 690-93.
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that discovery was necessary to determine the applicability, if
any, of the act of state doctrine.
IV.

COMMENT

The court in the instant case, apparently siding with the
Ninth5 3 and Third Circuits," adopted an ad hoc approach to antitrust cases involving the acts of a foreign sovereign - a "rule of
reason" approach that weighs factors of international comity
against legitimate United States antitrust interests. The instant
opinion is implicitly critical of the Second Circuit's decision in
Hunt v. Mobil Oil.5 1 The instant court indicated that persuasive
arguments have been made to the effect that a broad construction
of the act of state doctrine invites potential antitrust conspirators
to involve foreign governments in anticompetitive schemes.5 The
Hunt rationale has received widespread criticism for uselessly
7
thwarting legitimate regulatory interests of the United States.1 It
is significant that a district court in the Second Circuit has, at
least impliedly, joined in this criticism. The instant case, if appealed, may provide a proper vehicle for the Second Circuit to
modify and revise the Hunt rationale. It should be noted, however, that there is a lack of proper substantiation for the instant
court's finding that an act normally immune from judicial inquiry, such as the quintessentially public act of expropriation,
may lose its privileged status if it is repudiated.5 8 Although Sabbatino discussed both the possibility of a determination by the
United States executive branch that a foreign government's act is
in violation of international law and the legal repercussions that
might conceivably flow therefrom, 59 Sabbatino did not address
the situation in which a foreign sovereign repudiates its own former act. Furthermore, the instant court stretched the holding of
Hunt when it cited that case in support of the proposition that an

53. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S. A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976).
54. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
55. 550 F.2d 68 (1977).
56. 473 F. Supp. at 689.
57. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
58. The instant court cited Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 432, as supporting this theory. 473 F. Supp. at 690. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
59. 376 U.S. at 432.

Fall 1980]

RECENT DECISIONS

act of state may be scrutinized by the courts if it resulted from

the corruption of government officials.6 0 Noerr61 did hold, in a domestic setting, that the act of state doctrine does not immunize
lobbying efforts that are clearly "sham," or fraudulent. 2 As the
instant court correctly argued in a footnote, 63 however, it is an
open question whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, with its
"sham" exception, applies to the lobbying of foreign governments.
Thus, while the instant case appears to be correctly decided, the
court's opinion does not impart any further clarity or direction to
the act of state doctrine and its exceptions. The instant decision,
however, has dual significance. First, the district court impliedly
criticized Hunt, which could be influential in modifying the Second Circuit's Hunt rationale if the instant case is appealed. Second, the court exhibited a reluctance to abdicate subject matter
jurisidiction at an early stage of the antitrust litigation because of
the existence of both apparent involvement of United States interests and the presence of factual disputes concerning the applicability of the act of state doctrine.
Jeffrey Paul Marston

60. 473 F. Supp. at 690. In Hunt, the Second Circuit stated that there was
no express or implied allegation that representatives of the foreign government
"were seduced or enticed in any manner by the payment of bribes or boodle to
take the action complained about .... This appeal therefore is not the proper

vehicle for consideration of international commercial bribery in so far as it affects the act of state doctrine." 550 F.2d at 79.
61. 365 U.S. 127 (1961); See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
62. Id. at 144; See also CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unltd.,
404 U.S. at 511.
63. 473 F. Supp. at 690.

TRANSPORTATION-INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-ICC HAS
PLENARY AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER JOINT THROUGH
ROUTES BETWEEN OUTLYING POSSESSIONS OR TERRITORIES AND THE
UNITED STATES

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Petitioner, Trailer Marine Transport Corporation (TMT), a
common carrier by water, filed a tariff with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)' for a new rail-water intermodal service 2
on a joint through route3 between Puerto Rico and inland points4
in the United States. The ICC, asserting exclusive jurisdiction,
1. In connection with the regulation of rates, fares, and charges of common
carriers by public service commissions, the carriers are generally required to
publish schedules of charges, commonly referred to as tariff schedules. By virtue
of the Interstate Commerce Act, common carriers have the duty to adhere to
such tariff schedules, and may not charge a greater or lesser compensation for
the transportation of passengers or property than the rates, fares, and charges
specified in the schedules. Such rates, fares, and charges named in the schedule
become the legal rate for services rendered, and must be charged by the carrier
and paid by the shipper or passenger without deviation. 13 AM. Jur. 2d Carriers
§ 107 (1964). TMT's tariff was filed in August 1977. Since early 1975, TMT had
operated a single rate, all-water service between Florida and Puerto Rico, and
had fied tariffs with the Federal Maritime Commission under the Intercoastal
Shipping Act, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976).
2. "Intermodal" is a term used to define one continuous route of carriage
composed of two different modes of transportation. See Dempsey, The Contemporary Evolution of Intermodal and InternationalTransportRegulation Under
the Interstate Commerce Act: Land, Sea, and Air Coordination of Foreign
Commerce Movements, 10 VAND. J. TRNSNAT'L L. 505, 547 (1977).
3. A "joint through route" has been defined as a "through movement of
cargo from a point of origin on the line of one carrier to a point of destination on
the line of the other." Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. ICC, 561 F.2d 278, 282
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). A "joint through rate" has
been defined as the "single charge published by one carrier and concurred in by
connecting carriers as the rate that will apply" for carriage along a joint through
route. 561 F.2d at 281-82.
4. Jurisdiction was asserted under the recently recodified Interstate Commerce Act, which provides:
(a) Subject to . . . [§§ 10501-10562 of the Interstate Commerce Act as
amended and recodified, establishing the jurisdiction of the ICC] and
other law, the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction over
transportation(1) by rail carrier ... [and] water common carrier ... that is-
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accepted the tariff. Respondent, Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC), then ordered TMT to show cause why it was not in violation of the Intercoastal Shipping Act.5 Specifically, the FMC ordered TMT to justify its refusal to acknowledge FMC jurisdiction
over the marine segment of the route and to disclose the proportionate division of rates applicable to rail and water transportation. 6 The FMC subsequently issued a Report and Order directing TMT to file tariffs within thirty days.7 TMT's motion for
a stay of the FMC order was granted" pending judicial appeal to
determine proper regulatory jurisdiction., On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, vacated in part and remanded in part.Held: The Interstate
Commerce Act and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, read together,
confer plenary and exclusive jurisdiction on the ICC to regulate

(B) by railroad and water, when the transportation is under
common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment ...

[and]

(2) to the extent the transportationis in the United States and is
between a place in(C) a State and a place in a territory or possession of the
United States...

49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1979) (emphasis added).
5. Pub. L. No. 72-415, ch. 199, 47 Stat. 1425-27 (1933), as amended, 46
U.S.C. §§ 843-848 (1976). The Intercoastal Shipping Act is a part of the Shipping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-260, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916), as amended,
46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976).
6. See FMC Docket No. 77-55, Trailer Marine Transport CorporationJoint Single Factor Rates, Puerto Rican Trade, Order to Show Cause and File
Section 21 Reports, Nov. 18, 1977.
FMC contended that information concerning the share of the revenues collected by TMT would be necessary to enable FMC to determine the reasonableness of TMT's rates for port-to-port service even if no through rate was charged.
7. FMC Docket No. 77-75, In Re: Trailer Marine Transport CorporationJoint Single FactorRates, Puerto Rican Trade, Report and Order of March 15,
1978.
8. The motion was granted by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
on May 5, 1978.
9. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) appeared as an intervenor. Sea-Land is
a common carrier by water in direct competition with TMT that filed tariffs for
a similar joint through route with both the FMC and the ICC. The ICC asserted
exclusive jurisdiction, but a majority of ICC Commissioners voted to defer a
final ruling on whether the ICC should seek to enforce its assertion pending
judicial resolution of the jurisdictional issue.
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both rail and water segments of joint through trade between
Puerto Rico and inland points in the United States. Trailer
Marine Transport Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 602
F.2d 379 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission are two of three regulatory agencies that regulate transportation in foreign commerce.10 The FMC has substantive regulatory jurisdiction over common carriers engaged in
water transportation in either foreign or interstate commerce, including transportation by water from port to port between a state
and a territory of the United States.1 The ICC has jurisdiction
over rail, motor, and water carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders,' 3 as well as a congressional mandate to ensure the development, coordination, and preservation of a transportation system
to meet the transportation needs of the United States.

4

ICC pol-

icy governing regulation of joint through routes and rates has undergone change and modification because amendment and
recodification have altered ICC jurisdiction.15 Sections 1, 6, and
15 of the first Interstate Commerce Act (Act) defined the substantive regulatory power of the ICC.' 6 Section 1 outlined ICC
jurisdiction, section 6 required carriers subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act to publish and file tariffs, including the rates for
transportation or service under the Act, with the ICC, and section
11
15 empowered the ICC to regulate rates that violated the Act.
These three sections defined carriers and routes subject to tariff
filing requirements and substantive regulatory powers of the ICC.
Originally, section 1 limited ICC jurisdiction to rail-water joint
10. The third agency is the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which regulates
domestic and international air carriers.
11. The FMC regulates ocean carriers pursuant to two statutes: the Shipping
Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976) and the Intercoastal Shipping Act of
1933, 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-848 (1976).
12. 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1976).
13. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10501, 10521, 10541, 10561 (1979).
14. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101(a) (1979).
15. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. ICC, 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir.
1977), in which the court states a brief history of the ICC's position on joint
through rates.
16. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
17.

Id.
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through routes between the United States and an adjacent foreign
country.18 Under the constraint of this "adjacent" limitation, the
ICC established its policy governing the filing of rail-water joint
international through route tariffs in Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.
v. Hamburg-AmericanPacket Co.19 The ICC asserted that section
1 made a clear distinction between commerce within the United
States and commerce with a foreign country not adjacent to the
United States, and found that the Act precluded ICC jurisdiction
over foreign commerce when there was a continuous carriage of
goods beyond United States' ports.2 0 The ICC also determined
that it was powerless to require the filing of rail-water joint
through rates because section 6 contemplated only the filing of
joint rates between two or more carriers designated in section 1 as
subject to ICC regulation.2 1 Furthermore, the ICC noted that
Congress had not sought to exercise control over all-water carriage, whether transoceanic or inland.22 Despite the subsequent
exercise of congressional control over all-water carriage routes
under the Shipping Act of 191623 and a change in the language of
section 1, effected by the Transportation Act of 1920,24 the ICC
18. Section 1 provided:
[t]hat the provisions of this Act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by
railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used,
under a common control, management, or arrangement, for a continuous
carriage or shipment, from.., any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or. . . from a foreign country to any place in the
United States and carried to such place from a port of entry either in the
United States or an adjacent foreign country ....
Id. (emphasis added).
19. 13 I.C.C. 266 (1908).
20. Id. at 271.
21. Id. at 280.
22. Id. at 270.
23. Pub. L. No. 64-260, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916). The Shipping Act of
1916 subjected carriers on all-water inland and oceanic routes to government
regulation. Section 3 of the Shipping Act created the United States Shipping
Board, which was given the power to regulate all-water inland and oceanic
transportation.
24. Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, §§ 400-403, 41 Stat. 474 (1920). The Transportation Act of 1920 expanded ICC jurisdiction under Section 1 of the Interstate
Commerce Act to include carriers engaged in rail-water joint through routes between any place in the United States and a foreign country, "but only insofar as
such transportation .

.

. takes place within the United States." See § 400(1)

(codified at 49 U.S.C. §1(1) (1976)). This limiting language followed an ambigu-
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adhered to a policy prohibiting inland domestic carriers from
filing joint through rates with ocean carriers. In United States v.
Pennsylvania Railway Co.25 the Supreme Court recognized the
ICC's substantive regulatory jurisdiction over rail-water joint
through routes passing through a foreign port and international
waters. The PennsylvaniaRailway Court construed the statutory
limitation of ICC jurisdiction "within the United States" as an
expression of congressional intent to prevent the ICC from regulating rail transportation in foreign countries. 26 The Court held
that the limitation clause did not restrict ICC power to regulate
routes between two points within the United States merely because a substantial part of the carriage traversed waters outside
the territorial limits of the United States. 7 Despite this increased
jurisdiction, the ICC still did not require the filing of rail-water
joint through rates. The ICC, however, traditionally accepted the
filing of rail-water joint through rates for routes between inland
points in the continental United States and points in Alaska and
Hawaii.2 I After Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to Statehood,2 '
ous paragraph describing the types of routes under ICC jurisdiction, the full text
of which is as follows:
[Transportation] from one State or Territory of the United States, or the
District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States,
or the District of Columbia, or from one place in a Territory to another
place in the same Territory, or from any place in the United States
through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, or from
or to any place in the United States to or from a foreign country, but only
in so far as such transportation or transmission takes place within the
United States.
25. 323 U.S. 612 (1945), in which the authority of the ICC to require a railroad to interchange its cars with a water carrier along the subject route was
upheld.
26. Id. at 621.
27. Id. at 622. Specifically, the Court held that "there is... nothing in the
[Interstate Commerce] Act to deny the Commission the same power over interstate rail-water transportation which passes through foreign waters, as ... it

enjoys where the transit is wholly within the territorial limits of the United
States."
28. See Dempsey, supra note 2. The ICC required the filing of joint through
rates, but recognized that it had no substantive regulatory jurisdiction over
water carriers.
29. In the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, 48 U.S.C. preceding § 21 (1976) and
the Hawaii Statehood Act, 48 U.S.C. preceding § 491 (1976), Congress explicitly
affirmed retention of FMC jurisdiction over water transportation on intermodal
joint through routes between the two new states and the continental United
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Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act 0 to give the ICC
exclusive jurisdiction over through intermodal transportation between the two outlying states and the continental United States.3 1
The ICC then developed regulatory expertise over transportation
32
by water carriers traditionally falling within FMC jurisdiction.
The ICC, however, continued to assert that it was not statutorily
empowered to accept the filing of joint international tariffs between common carriers subject to its jurisdiction and ocean carriers subject to FMC jurisdiction.3
As a result of a continuing rulemaking proceeding, 4 in Ex
Parte 261, InternationalJoint Rates and Through Routes,3 5 the
ICC prescribed rules requiring the filing of joint international
through rates with the ICC. The ICC asserted substantive regulatory power over only the domestic portion of such routes, expressly denying any intention to assert jurisdiction or substantive
regulation of the ocean portion of the rates.3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld this procedure
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. ICC37
Congress recently recodified the Interstate Commerce Act 8 in
order to restate, in comprehensive form, but without substantive
change, the original Act and related laws.3 9 The language in sec-

States. See Dempsey, supra note 2, at 547.
30. 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1976).
31. See Pipe Line Mach. & Equip., Various States to Alaska, 349 I.C.C. 799,
806 (1975); Joint Rail-Water Rates to Hawaii, Matson Nav. Co., 351 i.C.C. 213,
217 (1975). See also Dempsey, supra note 2, at 548.
32. See Dempsey, supra note 2, at 548 n.166.

33. Id. at 548.
34.

The rulemaking proceeding is reported at 351 I.C.C. 490 (1976); 350

I.C.C. 361 (1975); 346 I.C.C. 688 (1974); 341 I.C.C. 246 (1972); and 337 I.C.C. 625
(1970).

35. Ex Parte 261, In the Matter of Tariffs Containing Joint Rates and
Through Routes for the Transportation of Property Between Points in the
United States and Points in Foreign Countries, was reported on at each of the
citations in note 34, supra.
36. 351 I.C.C. 490, 491 (1976).
37. 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

38. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11916 (1979).
39. Recodification of the Interstate Commerce Act and related laws was effected by the Revised Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat.
1337 (1978). Section 1 of the Act effects the recodification, section 2 effects certain technical and conforming changes in related laws, section 3(a) provides that
"Sections 1 and 2 of this Act restate, without substantive change, laws enacted
before May 16, 1978, that were replaced by those sections. Those sections may
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tion 1 limiting ICC jurisdiction to transportation "within the

United States," however, has been changed. The ICC now has
jurisdiction over rail and water carriers transporting under an
arrangement for continuous shipment with the United States between a state and a territory or possession of the United States.40
Since recodification of the Interstate Commerce Act was enacted
in 1979, the instant case is the first to interpret substantive regulatory jurisdiction in its new form.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Presented with the first opportunity to construe the Interstate
Commerce Act recodification, the instant court analyzed the prerecodification language in order to determine congressional intent 41 with respect to the proscription against construing the Act
as effecting substantive change.' 2 The court found that the
recodification of sections 1(1),"4

6(1), 4 4 and 15(1) 4 ' explicitly

granted the ICC substantive regulatory jurisdiction over joint
through rates involving both rail and water segments of transportation between Puerto Rico and inland points in the United
States.4" Applying this analysis, the court construed the effect of
the recodification of section 1.47 FMC argued that ICC jurisdic-

tion under the recodification was limited to regulation of transportation "in the United States,"" with United States defined as
not be construed as making a substantive change in the laws replaced." Id., 92
Stat. 1466. See also H.R. REP. No. 98, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3009, 3013.

40. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(a)(2)(C) (1979).

41. 602 F.2d at 383, n.18.
42.

See note 39, supra.

43. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501 (1979).
44. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10762(a)(1) (1979).
45. 49 U.S.C.A. 10704(a)(1) (1979).
46. 602 F.2d at 385. As stated on page 5, supra, the ICC has jurisdiction over
transportation between a state and a place in a territory or possession of the
United States. Although the cases are inconsistent in their labeling of Puerto
Rico, the courts have referred to Puerto Rico as a "territory," (DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)), "quasi-territory," (Benedicto v. West India and Panama
Telegraph Co., 256 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1919)), or "organized territory," (Kopel v.
Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909)). The court found that, whatever the appellation,
the territorial status of Puerto Rico is well established. 602 F.2d at 385, n.26.
47. 602 F.2d at 386. The court found that the FMC's challenge to jurisdiction based on recodification of section 1 was a plausible objection.

48. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(a)(2) (1979).
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the states of the United States and the District of Columbia. 49
The court, however, found that accepting FMC construction of
the recodification limitation clause would restrict the ICC from
asserting jurisdiction over any route that crossed the "high
seas."' 50 The court posited two objections to the FMC construc-

tion. 1 First, the court noted that the limitation clause has been
construed only to restrict the ICC from asserting jurisdiction over
foreign carriers within foreign countries. 5 2 Because the court gave
the recodification limitation clause the same construction as the
original limitation clause in section 1," the court found express
Supreme Court approval of substantive ICC regulation of railwater joint through routes passing through international waters in
United States v. Pennsylvania Railway Co.5' The court determined that the regulatory power upheld in PennsylvaniaRailway
pertained to the instant case because substantive regulation of
both routes was subject to the same limitation. 55 Second, the instant court asserted that the revised statute, examined in light of
pre-recodification language, did not support the FMC construction.5" The court found that the section 1 clause was ambiguous
and inapj~licable to some of the routes in the clause it modified.57
The court also found that while the recodification authors intended that the limitation clause should apply to each of the descriptive clauses, both common sense and legislative history militate against this construction." In light of the explicit
congressional intent that the recodification did not substantively

49.
50.
space
51.
52.
53.
54.

49 U.S.C.A. § 10102(24) (1979).
602 F.2d at 387. The court found that the "high seas" are international
over which no country has dominion.
Id. at 387-92.
Id. at 389. See also id. at 389, n.46.
Id. at 391-92.
323 U.S. 612 (1945). See n.4, supra.

55. 602 F.2d at 392.
56. Id. at 387.
57. Id. at 388. The pre-recodification clause is found at 49 U.S.C. § 1(1)(c)
(1976) and provides for jurisdiction over transportation
[f]rom one State or Territory of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, or from one place in a Territory to another place in the same
Territory, or from any place in the United States through a foreign coun-

try to any other place in the United States, or from or to any place in the
United States to or from a foreign country, but only insofar as such trans-

portation or transmission takes place within the United States.
58. 602 F.2d at 388.
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alter any provision or meaning of the original statute, the instant
court determined that the limitation clause was inapplicable to
the route in question."" Distinguishing ICC jurisdiction from
FMC jurisdiction, the court found that FMC regulatory expertise
and jurisdiction is limited to single rate, all-water transportation
between United States ports and ports in territories, possessions,
foreign countries, or other states, as well as all-water through
rates.6 0 The court further noted that FMC jurisdiction is specifically limited to routes over which the ICC does not have jurisdiction."1 Finally, the court held that the statutes creating FMC and
ICC jurisdiction, read together, confer exclusive and plenary ICC
jurisdiction over the route in question.6 2
IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision is significant both for the court's method
of analyzing the recodified Interstate Commerce Act and for the
specific result. The method of analysis is significant because, in
this case of first impression, the court was free to define an original method of analysis to apply to the recodified Act. The court
disregarded the change in language of the recodification which, on
its face, seems to deny ICC jurisdiction over the route in question, and reinstated pre-recodification interpretation of the Act as
the proper framework for analysis.6 3 The court used the most
reasonable method of analysis. An interpretation that the
recodification created a new jurisdictional scheme would deny the
ICC jurisdiction it has traditionally exercised. Also, the court's

59. Id. at 392. The court concluded that the only purpose served by limiting
ICC jurisdiction is to avoid conflicts between the United States and foreign
countries.

60. Id. at 386, 394.
61. Id. at 395. The court discussed FMC statutory powers at length, but this
discussion was dicta.
62. Id. at 381. The court also stated policy considerations behind the deci-

sion. Among these policy considerations were the express congressional provision
for ICC jurisdiction over analogous joint through routes between the continental
United States and Alaska or Hawaii; the greater efficiencies and benefits to be
derived from single agency regulation of transportation to the full extent of of-

fered service in the domestic offshore trades; and the absence of any showing
that the FMC is more qualified than the ICC to regulate the route in question.
Id. at 399-400.
63. In fact, the court referred to the more familiar pre-recodification sections
in the text of the opinion, relegating the recodification sections to footnotes.
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method complied with the admonition against the recodification
effecting substantive change. Use of the court's interpretation of
the recodified Act will prevent jurisdictional chaos and permit
government regulatory bodies to maintain their traditional jurisdiction. The specific result in the case is important because the
court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC over joint
through routes between a point in the United States and an outlying possession, territory, or state. This reaffirmed ICC jurisdiction to the full extent asserted under Ex Parte 261.64 Under the
instant decision, regulation of transportation is further consolidated into one administrative agency. Consolidation will lead to
greater administrative efficiency and allow the ICC to develop a
transportation system to meet the needs of an expanding international economy.
Thomas William Baker

64. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. ICC, supra note 15, the court was
confronted with the question of filing tariffs for international joint through
routes. The ICC did not attempt to assert substantive regulatory jurisdiction
over the marine segment of the route, recognizing that it fell with FMC
jurisdiction.

